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RightTRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES = 
A JAPANESE ASSESSMENT* 
By KIYOSHI KOJIMA** 
Among the most important themes of the Second United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development in New Delhi earlier this year, 1968, was the discussion of schemes for 
general trade preferences for developing countries. Japan is one of the developed countries 
in the process of defining her attitude on this question. Over the last few years, there has 
been lively debate among Japanese government officials, businessmen, and academic economists 
about what attitude Japan might best adopt. In November 1967, the Japanese government 
finally lined up beside other OECD countries and opted for the scheme of general trade pre-
ferences. The estimates of the impact of preferences on Japanese trade, spelled out in this 
paper, played a not insignificant part in leading Japanese opinion towards this more positive 
position.l 
General trade preferences will have trade creating effects, trade diverting effects, and 
dynamic effects. This paper aims, firstly, to assess the impact of preferences for developing 
countries upon Japan's imports and exports and thereby provide some of the basic information 
necessary to more effective trade policy decision-making. Secondly, alternative preference 
schemes, such as the advance cut and tariff quota proposals are compared. Finally, I put 
forward a new suggestion, a proposal for aid cum preferences, which may commend itself to 
developed and developing countries alike. 
I. The Trade Creation Effect : Increases in Japa,e's Imports 
Japan's imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing countries are 
differentiated from imports originating in developed countries in kind and quality. The 
increase in Japanese imports due to the extension of trade preferences for developing countries 
can therefore be estimated using a familiar model. The trade diversion effects on developed 
country exporters are neglected and attention focussed on the trade creation effects on Japanese 
im ports. 
In Figure 1, D represents Japan's (or any preference-giving country's) import demand 
schedule for some developing country export commodity, X; S repersents the developing 
countries' export supply schedule; and S/ represents the tariff-ridden export schedule. Before 
* I am much indebted to Dr. Peter Drysdale, of the Australian National University, for his work on 
the English version of this paper. 
** Professor (Kyo~ju) of International Economics. 
1 These estimates were originally published in Japanese in Kanzei Chosa Gepp~, Ministry of Finance, 
Vol. 20, No. 3. April-May, 1967, and summarised in the Economist (Tokyo), 29th August, 1967. 2 
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FIG. I . TRADE CREATION EFFECTS 
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the extension of preferences, Japan imported OA units of X at price VP, the value of imports 
from developing countries being OPaA. In Japanese markets, commodity X is sold at the 
price OQ, higher than the developing countries' export price by the extent of the tariff, t, 
Japanese tariff revenue being PQba. 
Now, suppose tariffs on imports from developing countries are abolished. The tariff 
preference margin, p, then equals unity.2 The price of the developing country export rises 
from P to R. The rate of price increase is shown by: 
~= 
. ) 
Vj t  "x  j+E P l+t (1)  tt 
The price of X in Japan, inclusive of tariff, falls from Q, or (1+t)p, to R The rate of pnc(~ 
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where vj is the price elasticity of Japan's import demand and eu is the price elasticity of 
developing countries' export supply. If the original value of Japan's imports is denoted by 
M,3 the increase in imports is shown by: 
AM= 1:c(1+eu)M ( 3 ) 
Using thi5 model, estimates of the increase in Japanese imports in consequence of the' 
extension of hundred per cent tariff preferences were made for twelve sensitive commodities 
of importance to developing countries. The initial estimates were made on a disaggregated 
basis but they are aggregated and summarised in Table 1. One important problem was the 
estimation of the price elasticities. Vj and eu' As shown in Table I , the twelve commodities. 
analysed were classified into three broad groups-lightly processed intermediate manufactures, 
highly processed intermediate manufactures, and finished manufactures-and three broad 
z If p is l, then P' t t  l+t simply becomes l+t m equations (1) and (2). 
3 If the initial P is taken to be l. M represents both the volume and value of imports. 1969] TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : A JAPANESE ASSESSMENT 3 
elasticity bands assigned accordingly. The precise values of these elasticity bands are ultimately 
guesswork but their orders of magnitude are pobably accurate enough.4 
In 1964, developing country exports of these twelve commodities to Japan were valued 
at $US 3.69 millions which represented a 10 per cent share in the relevant Japanese markets. 
The estimates set out in Table I suggest that if tariffs were abolished on developing country 
exports to Japan (that is, P equalled unity), they would expand by $US 0.91 millions, or 24,7 
per cent, on 1964 trade figures.5 Although the percentage increase appears large, the size of 
the increase is relatively insignificant when compared with annual increases in Japanese exports 
of the order of $US 1,000 millions. The fact is that Japan still maintains a strong comparative 
advantage in traditional labour intensive manufacturing industries of the type most competitive 
with potential export industries in developing countries. 
In Japan, nonetheless, there remains a strong fear that certain traditional labour intensive 
industries, typically comprising small scale firms concentrated in particular industrial districts, 
would be severely damaged by the extension of tariff preferences. This fear tends to be 
4 The price elasticity of Japan's imports, ~j, is estimated according to the formula: 
,=0( P ea+ C .,l~ 
~ ~~ ~7•, ),  where C, the elasticity of domestic prices in response to changes in prices of competrtrve rmports Is 
supposed to be 0.5 for all commodity categories; ~~'  the ratio of domestic production to competitive 
C 
imports from developing countries, is assumed to be 4 for all commodity categories; ~~'  the ratio of 
consumption (i.e. C=P+iTl) to imports, is assumed necessarily to be 5 for all commodity categories; 
a,,, the price elasticity of domestic supply, is assumed to be 0.1 for lightly processed intermediate manu-
factures O 2 for h' hl  , . rg y processed intermediate manufactures, and O.4 for finished manufactures; and 1?,a, 
the price elasticity of domestic demand, is supposed to be 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 for respective commodity cate' 
gory. It results in that Vj would be O.7 for lightly processed intermediate manufactures, 1.9- for highly 
processed intermediate manufactures, and 2.1 for finished manufactures. The values of vj assumed as 
above are not unrealistic and well compared with 1.57 estimated by Tatemoto for all imported com-
modities which involve by more than 80 per cent primary product of low elasticities. (Motohiro Tatemoto, 
Econolnetric Andysis of Foreign Trede (in Japanese), .Tokyo, 1963, Chap. 9-.) 
Similar method of assuming elasticities of import-demand is seen, for example, in Bela Balassa, 
"tariff Protection in Industrial Countries : An Evaluation," Jour"al ofPolitical Economy, December 1965, 
p. 592, and, for O, in John E. Floyd, "The Overvaluation of the Dollar : A Note on the International 
Price Mechanism," Alnerican Economic Review, March 1965, pp. 95-107. 
Practically no estimates are available for the price elasticity of export-supp]y, e. It is estimated ac-
cording to the formula 
(C~ (P~  C 5= IFA )7',d+~r/E(~, 
where - stands for the ratio of domestic consumption to exports regarding to a certain commodity and  X  P  T for the ratio of domestic production to exports. Basing upon the Japanese data for commodities 
C p 
concerned m thrs paper. T rs supposed to be 2 and T to be 3 for all commodities, whilst r,(, and ea 
are supposed to be the same as shown above. Thus, a is assumed to be 0.7 for lightly processed inter-
mediate manufactures, l.2 for highly processed intermediate manufactures, and 2.2 for finished manu-
factures. These values are commonly applied for developing countries (E~) and Japan (Ej), which will be 
used in the following section. 
5 On average, ;:x, the percentage increase in the price of developing country exports,would be about 8.6 
per cent. 4  HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF EcoNoMlcs [February 
TABLE 1. EFFECTS OF GENERAL PREFERENCE ON JAPAN'S IMPORTS 
FROM DEvELOPING COUNTRIES : 
AN ESTIMATE BASED UPoN TRADE FIGURES IN 1964 
Commodity Group 
Plywood 
Cotton yarn and thread 
Yarn and thread of synthetic fibres 




Articles of plastic materials 
Travel goods, handbags 
Small-wares and toilet ariicles 
Children's toys 
Lighters 
Total or Average 
M~ AM~ dM~/M~  $1, OOO c ~~ 

















































































12, 210 20. O 328 
1,343 25. 4 255 
86 26. 2 8. 15 2. 1 2. 2 
81 31. 7 9. 91 2. 1 2. 2 
36, 472  3, 693 913 24. 7 8. 56 
Source : Based on data and methods described in the text. 
exaggerated both by the vested interests concerned and the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry. It is true that in recent years, Japan's imports of manufactured goods from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and India have been increasing rapidly, but they are 
still insigniflcant. However, taking this trend into account, and broadening the commodity 
coverage, it might be that around $US 50 millions worth of Japanese imports could be affected 
by the extension of trade preferences. If tariffs against developing country exports were 
completely eliminated, imports would increase by $US 13 mi]lions only. A fifty per cent 
tariff cut is probab]y a more realistic possibility, and besides some commodities are likely to 
be excepted. On this basis, the increase in Japanese imports would be somewhat less than 
$US 6.5 millions. There seem no strong grounds for Japan to oppose the provision of general 
trade preferences for fear of unmanageable increases in her imports. 
II. The Trade Diversion Effects : Decreases in Japan's Eaports 
A more serious problem for Japan is that her exports, particularly to North American 
markets, might suffer from tlle trade diversion effects of trade preferences extended by other 
developed countries to developing countries. A more complicated model is required in order 
to estimate the effects of both trade creation and trade diversion in a given developed country 
market, such as the United States. 
Suppose Japan competes with developing countries in the export of some manufactured 
commodity X to the American market. In figure 2, D represents the American demand 
schedule; Sj Japan's export supply schedule; and S~ the developing countries' export supply 1969] 
o 
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FIG. 2. TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DrvERsloN EFFECTS 
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schedule. By summation, a composite export supply schedule, S~+Sj is obtained. If tariffs 
are imposed against all imports by the United States, the tariff-ridden export supply schedules 
are represented by Sj/. S~/, and S*/+Sf• If tariffs are imposed only against Japanese imports 
S~+Sj' is the composite export supply schedule. And D-SJ' represents United States' demand 
for X from developing countries alone. 
Before the introduction of trade preferences, equilibrium is determined at b where D and 
S~'+Sj' intersect. This equilibrium is exactly equivalent to that described in Figure 1. The 
United States imports OA units of which Oj are supplied by Japan and the remainder, jA 
equal to Ue, are supplied by developing countries. The international price of imports is OP, 
whilst the price inclusive of tariff is OQ. 
Suppose that tariffs on commodities imported from developing countries are abolished 
(that is, the preference margin, p, is unity) and tariffs on Japanese imports remain unchanged. 
After the extension of tirade preferences, a new equilibrium is reached at c where D and 
S~+Sj' intersect. America increases her imports from OA to OB, of which Ok are supplied 
by Japan and the remainder, kB equal to Uf, are supplied by developing countries. The 
price of imports, inclusive of the tariff on Japanese supplies, falls from OQ to OR. Japanese 
export prices are forced down from OP to OP!, equivalent to the decrease in the American 
import price inclusive of tariff, that is, QR equals PP'. 
Thus, the quantity of American imports increases by AM* due to the trade creation 
effect of preferential tariff reductions, while the quantity of Japanese exports decreases by 
-AMj* due to the trade diversion effects. Developing country exports increase by AM~* which 
is the sum of the trade creation and trade diversion effects. 
AM AM*- ( - AMj*) = AITf*+ AMj* ( 4 ) 
The export price from developing countries after the extension of preferences, OR in 6 n'lTOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [February 
Figure 2, is shown by {1+(1-p)t}P(1+,-,x)' or simply P(1+1r,:)' if p equals unity. This ~vill 
equal the price of exports from Japan inclusive of the tariff, P(1+t)(1-1r~). 
p(1+t)(1-;Tm)={1+(1 p)t}P(1+1r~:) ( 5 ) 
The rate of decrease in the United States' import price inclusive of the tariff will be: 
aeu JL fi_  ;r7n~ ' 
v +aE~+ (1 - a)sJ ~ 
and the rate of increase in the export price from developing countries will be: 
?rx~  +ae~+(1 -e()ej 1+t 
where 7 is the price elasticity of American import demand, e~ and ~j are the price elasticities 
of export supply from developing countries and Japan respectively, and a is the developing 
countries' share in American markets. 
Finally, the decrease in the value of Japan's exports, AMj, and the increase in the value 
of developing countries exports, AM~, will be: 
AMj =1T~(1 +sj)MJ ( 8 ) 
AMu = iT;c(1 +eu)Mu ( 9 ) 
Table 2 records nineteen manufactured commodities of importance to developing countries 
which compete with Japanese exports in the American market. In 1964, United States' 
imports of these commodities were valued at $US 1,600' millions. Japan supplied $US 540 
millions and developing countries supplied $US 465 millions. The nineteen items cover almost 
all the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods for which developing countries, as well 
as Japan, seek larger markets in the United States. The elasticity assumption,6 relevant 
American tariff rates, and results of calculations using the model described above are also 
detailed in Table 2. 
If the preference margin, P, is unity, it appears that developing countries would increase 
their exports to Arnerica by $US 176 millions, or 37.8 per cent on 1964 trade figures. The 
rise in developing country export prices, :T;e' would average 18.3 per cent. On the other hand, 
$US 22.5 millions or 4.1 per cent of Japanese exports would be diverted to developing countries 
and Japanese export prices would be forced down on average by 2.0 per cent. Thus, the 
United States would increase her imports by $US Ior3.5 millions or about 10 per cent on 1964 
6 The method of assuming elasticities is the same as shown in the previous note 4. The price elasticity 
of American import-demand, ~, is estimated to be 0.9 for lightly processed intermediate manufactures, 1.4 
for highly processed intermediate manufactures, and 2.5 for finished manufactures. These values are  C 
P  (=6.0) for the United States are supposed to be  higher than those for Japan since - (=5.0) and - ' M  M  larger than for Japan. The values of ~ as supposed as above may be compared with those of the Ball-
Mavwah study, for example, which shows that elasticities are 0.26 for crude materials. 1.~"8 for semi-
manufactures', and 3.5 for finished manufactures. (J. Ball and K. Mavwah, "The U.S. Demand for Im-
ports, 1948-1958," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1962, pp. 395-401.) If it is taken into 
account that imports from developing countries and Japan in this study consist of labour-intensive and 
less sophisticated manufactures with lower elasticities, the lower elasticities assumed here for finished 
manufactures than those of the Ball-Mavwah study may not be unrealistic. 7 
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figures-the difference between the increase in developing countries' exports and the reduction 
in Japan's exports. The increase in American imports is the trade creation effect of preferences 
resulting from the average fall of 2.0 per cent in American import prices inclusive of the 
tariff. 
The question is would the effect of trade diversion on Japanese exports be really serious ? 
The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry presented a very exaggerated 
estimate in early September 19677 which called forth considerable critical comment. It sug-
gested that Japanese exports to developed country markets valued at $US 900 millions would 
be affected by general trade preferences and that the loss of exports could be as large as 
$US 135-180 millions since Japanese export prices would be forced down to the full extent 
of tariff reductions in order to maintain export volumes. This Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry estimate is fundamentally in error since it completely neglects the probable 
increases in developed country imports in consequence of tariff reductions. Where the import 
price inclusive of tariff is reduced by 15 or 20 per cent, the value of exports, both from 
developing countries and Japan, will increase to the extent that the price elasticity of developed 
country import demand is greater than unity. 
Interestingly, in mid'October 1967, the Japanese Ministry of Finance published another 
estimate of the effects of tariff preferences8 which employed methods, and yielded results, 
similar to those found here. The Ministry of Finance estimate covers trade in six commodi-
ties additional to those analysed in Table 2 (cotton yarn and thread, manufactures of asbestos, 
furniture, Ieather, essential oil and resinoids, and electric fans) and is based on 1966 trade 
data. Japan's exports to the United States of the twenty five commodities studied were $US 
70-2 millions in 1966 and the Ministry of Finance estimated that they would fall by $US 27.7 
millions or 4.0 per cent, with a 2.0 per cent fall in average export prices (,'-,~), if United States 
tariffs were completely eliminated on imports from developing countries. If these estimates 
are extended to include Japanese exports not only to the United States but also to Canada, 
the EEC, EFTA, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand, the decrease in exports would amount 
to around $US 40 millions. This seems a fairly reasonable estimate. 
Again, the trade diversion effect of general trade preferences upon Japan would not be 
nearly so serious as is widely feared. If the preference margin, p, were O.5 instead of unity, 
exports would fall by only $US 20 millions. This would, however, be greater than the increase 
in Japan's own imports of approximately $US 6.5 millions. Japan is, indeed, the only advanced 
country, with perhaps the exception of Italy, which exports traditional labour intensive man-
ufactures in competition with developing countries and is open to significant trade diversion 
losses. It is for these reasons that, within the OECD, the Japanese government has pressed 
for sharing the burden of tariff preferences, not only in terms of their effect through increas-
ing imports but also in terms of their effect in diverting developed country exports away to 
developing countries. How exactly this might be effected is a separate and difficult problem 
for the governments concerned. 
Is there any means whereby Japan could overcome the trade diversion effect of trade 
preferences and expand her exports along with, though more slowly than, developing countries ? 
This, I feel, depends on the kind of trade preference scheme adopted. 
? Mamoru Okita, "Impacts on Japanese Trade of Preferences to Developing Countries," Eco'ro'nist 
(Tokyo), September 26, 1967. 
8 Bureau of Customs, Ministry of Finance, A Repol't 0'2 Preferences, October 11, 1967. 1969]  TRADE PREFERENCE:S FOR DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES = A JAPANESE ASSESSMENT 
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Quota Pre erence Schemes  III. Advance Cut versus Tan 
Two alternative preference schemes have been presented to OECD countries : the advance 
cut plan advocated by the United States and the tariff quota plan supported by EEC countries. 
It has been suggested that the advance cut preference scheme could be applied either by 
reducing tariffs on dcveloping country products to the full extent of concessions agreed under 
Kennedy Round negotiations ol~ by reducing tariffs on developing country products under 
negotiations between developing countries and developed countries within GATT, to be fol-
lowed by a new round of negotiations among developed countries designed to effect the staged 
reduction of MFN tariffs over 5 or 10 years. Either way, the advance cut plan ensures that 
general preferences are temporary and that they are consistent with progress towards global 
free trade. These are the significant merits of the advance cut proposals. 
On the other hand, the tariff quota scheme appears more open to protectionist abuses, and 
unlikely to promote trade liberalisation in developed countries. Quotas on selected commodities 
from particular developing country sources would be subject to arbitrary alteration and MFN 
tariffs could even be raised to provide larger preference margins. Fundamentally, the tariff 
quota plan does not aim at progress towards global free trade but sets out to prevent "market 
disruption" by developing country products. From the standpoint of encouraging the expansion 
of world trade, the advance cut proposals seem preferable. 
From Japan's viewpoint also the advance cut proposals seem superior to the tariff quota 
proposals. Under the tariff quota plan, Japan would suffer trade diversion effects of the kind 
analysed above. On the other hand, if, as envisaged under tlle advance cut plan, MFN 
tariffs were gradually reduced. Japanese exports would expand along with exports from deve-
loping countries. In the early phases of implementing an advance cut scheme, preference 
margins would induce trade diversion at Japan's expense. In later phases, as preference 
margins narrow and larger MFN tariff reductions apply, the expansionary effect on Japanese 
exports would more than compensate for the losses from trade diversion, whilst developing 
country exports would continue to expand because of the effects of scale economies and 
increased productivity on international competitiveness.9 
Thus, Japan would not be harmed so much by the advance cut as by the tariff quota 
plan and could even benefit from it provided developed countries ultimately undertook MFN 
tariff reductions. Under the advance cut plan trade expansion among developed countries 
would offset the impact of trade diversion towards developing countries. Indeed, the Japanese 
government should press for sharing the burden of trade diversion by insisting on MFN tariff 
9 Suppose that 1) America imported, in the initial year, $US 600 millions from Japan and $US 400 millions 
from developing countries; 2) American tariffs were 30 per cent; 3) P equals 0.5, both under an advance 
cut and a tariff quota plan; 4) tariffs are reduced by 10 per cent in each of five years under the advance 
cut plan while they are reduced by 50 per cent from the first year but quotas are not reached within five 
years under the tariff quota p]an; 5) 7?,=2.5 and ej=2.2; and 6) e* will increase from 1,1 in the first year 
to 1.65. 2.2, 2.75 and 3.3 in successive years. Under these assumptions, over the whole five years, 
Japanese exports would fall by $ US 205 millions or 6.8 per cent under the tariff quota plan, whilst they 
would increase by $ US 306 millions or 10.2 per cent under the advance cut plan. Exports of developing 
countries would increase by $ US 671 millions or 33.4 per cent in the case of the tariff quota plan and 
by $ US 514 millions or 23.7 per cent in the case of the advance cut plan. 10 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [February 
reductions among developed countries, particularly on those commodities on which she would 
suffer most trade diversion. 
Japan has many interests in common with developing countries. She still depends heavily 
on the export of traditional labour intensive manufactures in competition with developing 
countries but, Iike them, she desires freer access to developed country markets for these 
exports. If the second variant of the advance cut proposals were applied again and again 
it would serve to break down protectionism in high wage developed countries. It is im-
portant to emphasise that for developing countries, too, the benefits of trade preference schemes 
derive not so much from discri,nination in tariff treatment but more from the reduction of 
tariffs in developed countries.lo 
IV. A Scheme for Aid cum Trade Preferences 
Trade preferences for developing countries are justifiable if divergence from the principle 
of non-discrimination within GATT is temporary and they foster liberalisation of world trade. 
They are positively desirable if they encourage transformation in the international division of 
labour in such a way as to strengthen specialisation in the export of labour intensive exports 
from developing countries,ll But what this study and others have shown is that the static 
effects of preference schemes are not likely to be substantial.12 The prospects are generally 
discouraging for developing countries. The benefits for them may be even too small to justify 
the cost of carrying out the cumbersome administration of preferential treatment. The in-
creased earning power of developing countries which results from trade preference is certainly 
not likely to fill their huge foreign exchange gap.13 
Moreover, there are confiicting interests among the potential preference-receivers. The 
main interest of the less developed among the developing countries is not so much prefer-
ential tariff treatment on manufactured exports but, first, the expansion of traditional primary 
commodity exports and, second, the initiation of industrialisation with heavy dependence on 
aid from developed countries. 
In fact, developed countries have been reluctantly lead towards the provision of general 
trade preferences, not because they expect any substantial benefits to ffow to developing 
countries but because they recognise the political expedience of providing them. 
An aid cmn preference scheme could offer more benefits to developing countries. Aid, 
linked directly to preferential tariff treatment, appears consistent with the Prebisch report's 
ro In the footnote above, it has been shown that the benefits of the advance cut and tariff quota plans 
are not significantly different for developing countries, provided that the preference margin, p, is the 
same in both cases. 
11 Harry G. Johnson, "Trade Preferences and Developing Countries," IJoyds Bank Review, April 1966, 
p. 18 ; Harry G. Johnson, Econo"lic Policics Tote,ards Lcss Develo~d Count,ics, Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1967, Chapter 6. 
.12 See. Gardner Patterson, Discril,tination in 1,Iternotiond 7'radc, 77le Policy Issucs, 1945-1965, 
Princeton, 1966, pp. 358-359, pp. 381-383. John Pincus. Trade. Aid and Develop,nent. Council on 
Foreign Relations , 1967, Chapter 6. 
13 Grant L. Reuber. Caneda's Interest in the Trede Problems ofLess-Develo~id Cotintries, The Canadian 
Trade Committee and Private Planning Association of Canada, 1964, p, xii. 1969] TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES: A JAPANESE ASSEssMENT 11 
emphasis on the infant industry argument for preferences,Is Firstly, directly productive aidl; 
in the form of capital goods, advanced techniques of production, managerial know-how, and 
~vorker training, should be provided to developing countries on an increasingly large scale if 
the efficiency of new export-oriented industries, primary as well as manufacturing, is to be 
improved to the point where they become increasingly competitive in world markets. Secondly, 
developed countries should provide preferential treatment, say for five or ten years, to devel-
oping country exports launched with the help of directly productive aid. Preferences aimed 
at ensuring wider markets would serve as a sort of aid 'after-care', and might well be regarded 
as indispensable to realising the full benefits of aid. It is important that the provision of 
preferences should be closely linked with the provision of aid since either is likely to be 
ineffective and result in waste of resources if applied independently. 
The aid cwn preference scheme need not be confined to manufactured goods. It could 
also be useful for agricultural and mineral commodities of interest to developing countries. 
Commonly, however, developed country tariffs on these latter products are very low or non-
existent and there is little margin for granting preferences. In such cases, governments of 
the developed countries could provide a subsidy on imports from the developing countries 
for some specific period, say five years, until competitiveness is sufiiciently well established. 
In the past, Japan has stressed "development investment for import" as a useful form of 
aid to assist primary product exports from developing countries. The development of maize 
exports from Thailand to Japan is one successful example. It is in Japan's interests to switch 
purchases of raw materials and foodstuffs from developed to developing countries as much as 
possible, particularly since Japan usually has export surpluses with developing countries.16 The 
main difficulty, of course, is that developing countries are presently more expensive and less 
reliable sources of supply than developed countries. Large scale aid cum trade preferences 
could help overcome this difiiculty. 
The aid cw71 preference scheme might well be subject to criticism from developing countries 
on the grounds that it is not a 'general' preference scheme but, of its nature, would have to, 
be selective of both commodities and countries. However, if preferences are justifiable on 
infant industry grounds it seems appropriate for them to be both selective and temporary. 
In any case, the so called general trade preference schemes discussed above would involve 
selectivity in practice, and the beneficial effects of their 'generality' are likely to be nullified 
by selective administration. 
The aid cum preference scheme involves the provision of aid by developed countries, 
through the use of government funds and private capital, to selected industries in developing 
countries, and the import and marketing of the output by developed countries. The developed 
country should be not only ready to provide trade preferences but also press other de-
veloped countries to provide equivalent preferencesl7 (a procedure similar in principle to the' 
14 United Nations. Towards a New Trede Policy for Development, New York, 1964. 
15 See. Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Proposal for International Aid," The Developing Economies. The Institute' 
of Asian Economic Affairs, Tokyo, December 1964, and "Japan's Role in Asian Agricultural Develop-
ment," The Japan Quarterly. April-June, 1967. 
16 See. Kiyoshi Kojima, "A Paclfic Economrc Communrty and As an Dovelopmg Countries " Hitotsu-
bashi Journal of Econondcs, June 1966, and "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy," Hitotsubashi Journal of-
Economics, February 1966, pp. 54-55. 
17 See, David Wall, The Third World Challenge, Preferences for Development, The Atlantlc Tradi~ 
Study. London, 1967, pp. 44-48. 12 HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
multilateralisation of bilateral negotiations through MFN treatment within GATT). In this 
way, the generality of the preferences could be assured for preference-giving countries. 
Although industries to which aid and preferences are extended may be limited, the industries 
selected would be fully insured by developed countries in the production and marketing of 
their output. Thus, the aid cum preference scheme is potentially more useful than 'general' 
preference schemes which are only formally general in character. It should be remembered, 
for example, why British Preferences have benefited developing countries. The benefits de-
rived not so much from the preferences themselves but from all-round assistance with the 
provision of capital, management, and marketing skills.18 
Certainly, there are many technicalities of the aid cw?1 preference proposal that require 
further detailed study. For example, what should be the range of aid with which trade pre-
ferences are linked ? How could preferences be linked with aid through multi-national organi-
sations ? There are questions which need to be studied along with ways in which to soften 
the terms upon which aid is provided, both by developed and developing countries alike. 
IB See. Donald MacDougall and Rosemary Hutt. "Imperial Preference: A Quantitative Analysis," Econo 
Inic Journd, June 1954, p. 269. 